We propose interdependent defense (IDD) games, a computational game-theoretic framework to study aspects of the interdependence of risk and security in multi-agent systems under deliberate external attacks. Our model builds upon interdependent security (IDS) games, a model due to Heal and Kunreuther that considers the source of the risk to be the result of a fixed randomizedstrategy. We adapt IDS games to model the attacker's deliberate behavior. We define the attacker's pure-strategy space and utility function and derive appropriate cost functions for the defenders. We provide a complete characterization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE), and design a simple polynomial-time algorithm for computing all of them, for an important subclass of IDD games. In addition, we propose a randominstance generator of (general) IDD games based on a version of the real-world Internetderived Autonomous Systems (AS) graph (with around 27K nodes and 100K edges), and present promising empirical results using a simple learning heuristics to compute (approximate) MSNE in such games.
INTRODUCTION
Attacks carried out by hackers and terrorists over the last few years have led to increased efforts by both government and the private sector to create and adopt mechanisms to prevent future attacks. This effort has yielded a more focused research attention to models, computational and otherwise, that facilitate and help to improve (homeland) security for both physical infrastructure and cyberspace. In particular, there has been quite a bit of recent research activity in the general area of game-theoretic models for terrorism settings (see, e.g., Bier and Azaiez [2009] and Cárceles-Poveda and Tauman [2011] ).
Interdependent security (IDS) games are one of the earliest models resulting from a game-theoretic approach to model security in non-cooperative environments composed of free-will self-interested individual decision-makers. Originally introduced and studied by economists Kunreuther and Heal [2003] , IDS games model general abstract security problems in which an individual within a population considers whether to voluntarily invest in some protection mechanisms or security against a risk they may face, knowing that the cost-effectiveness of the decision depends on the investment decisions of others in the population because of transfer risks (i.e., the "bad event" may be transferable from a compromised individual to another).
In their work, Kunreuther and Heal [2003] provided several examples based on their economics, finance and risk management expertise. (We refer the reader to their paper for more detailed descriptions.) As a canonical example of the real-world relevance of IDS settings and the applicability of IDS games, Heal and Kunreuther [2005] used this model to describe problems such as airline baggage security. In their setting, individual airlines may choose to invest in additional complementary equipment to screen passengers' bags and check for hazards such as bombs that could cause damage to their passengers, planes, buildings, or even reputations. However, mainly due to the large amount of traffic volume, it is impractical for an airline to go beyond applying security checks to bags incoming from passengers and include checks to baggage or cargo transferred from other airlines. On the other hand, if an airline invests in security, they can still experience a bad event if the bag was transferred from an airline that does not screen incoming bags, rendering their investment useless.
1 Thus, we can see how the cost-effectiveness of an investment can be highly dependent on others' investment decisions. Another recent application of the IDS model is on container shipping transportation [Gkonis and Psaraftis, 2010] . They use the IDS model to study the effect of investment decision on container screening of ports have on their neighboring ports.
In this work, we build on the literature in IDS games.
In particular, we adapt the model to situations in which the abstract "bad event" results from the deliberate action of an attacker. The "internal agents" (e.g., airlines and computer network users), whom we also often refer to as "defenders" or "sites," have the voluntary choice to individually invest in security to defend themselves against a direct or indirect offensive attack, modulo, of course, the cost-effectiveness to do so. A side benefit of explicitly modeling the attacker, as we do in our model, is that the probability of an attack results directly from the equilibrium analysis. Building IDS games can be hard because it requires a priori knowledge of the likelihood of an attack. Attacks of this kind are considered rare events and thus notoriously difficult to statistically estimate in general. Related Work. Johnson et al. [2010] and Fultz and Grossklags [2009] independently developed noncooperative game models similar to ours. Johnson et al. [2010] extend IDS games by modeling uncertainty about the source of the risk (i.e., the attacker) using a Bayesian game over risk parameters. Fultz and Grossklags [2009] propose and study a non-graphical game-theoretic model for the interactions between attackers and nodes in a network. In their model, each node in the network can decide on whether to contribute (by investment) to the overall safety of the network and/or to individual safety. The attackers can attack any number of nodes, but with each attack there is an increased probability that the attacker might get caught and suffer penalties or fines. Hence, while their game has IDS characteristics, it is technically not within the standard IDS game framework introduced by Heal and Kunreuther.
Most of the previous related work explore the realm of information security and are application/network specific (see Roy et al. [2010] for a survey on game theory application to network security). Past literature has largely focused on two-person (an attacker and a defender) games where the nodes in the network are regarded as a single entity (or a central defender). For example, Lye and Wing [2002] look at the interactions between an attacker and the (system) administrator using a two-player stochastic game. Recent work uses a Stackelberg game model in which the Schmitt, 2009 ] serves as a reminder that transfer risk still exists.
defender (or leader) commits to a mixed strategy to allocate resources to defend a set of nodes in the network, and the follower (or attacker) optimally allocates resources to attack a set of "targets" in the network given the leader's commitment [Jain et al., 2011 , Kiekintveld et al., 2009 , Korzhyk et al., 2010 , 2011a .
Other recent work strive to understand the motivation of the attackers. For example, Liu [2003] focus on understanding the attacker's intent, objectives, and strategies and derive a (two-player) game-theoretical model based on these, while Cremonini and Nizovtsev [2006] use cost-benefit analysis (of attackers) to address the issue of the optimal amount of security (of the nodes in the network). Our Contribution. We adapt the standard noncooperative framework of IDS games to settings in which the source of the risk is the result of a deliberate, strategic decision by an external attacker. In particular, we design and propose interdependent defense (IDD) games, a new class of games that, in contrast to standard IDS games, model the attacker explicitly, while maintaining a core component of IDS systems: the potential transferability of the risk resulting from an attack. We note that the explicit modeling of risk transfer is an aspect of our model that has not been a focus of previous game-theoretic attacker-defender models of security discussed earlier.
We formally define and study IDD games in depth in Section 3. We present several results that fully characterize their NE. 2 We also provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute all MSNE for the important subclass of IDD games in which there is only one attack, the defender nodes are fully transfer-vulnerable (i.e., investing in security does nothing to reduce their external/transfer risk) and transfers are one-hop.
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We note that considering a single attacker is a typical assumption in security settings (see previous work discussed earlier). It is also reasonable: We can view many attackers as a single attacker. Allowing at most one attack prevents immediate representational and computational intractability problems because the number of the attacker's (pure) strategies grows exponentially with the number of attacks. Finally, because the attacker has no fixed target, it is ineffective for the attacker to consider or go beyond plans of attacks involving multiple (> 2) transfers: such plans are complex, time consuming and costly.
Our computational results are significant and surprising because computing all NE in general IDS games is hard (i.e., the Nash-extension problem in general IDS games is NP-complete [Kearns and Ortiz, 2003] ). 4 We do not know of any other non-trivial game for which there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute all NE except ours and the algorithm for uniformtransfer IDS games of Kearns and Ortiz [2003] .
In Section 4, we provide experimental results from applying learning-in-games heuristics to compute approximate NE to both fixed and randomly-generated instances of IDD games, with at most one simultaneous attack and one-hop transfers, on a very large Internet AS graph (≈ 27K nodes and ≈ 100K edges).
IDS GAMES
Each player i in an IDS game has a choice to invest (a i = 1) or not invest (a i = 0). For each player i, C i and L i are the cost of investment and loss induce by the bad event, respectively. We define the ratio of the two parameters, the player's "cost-to-loss" ratio, as ρ i ≡ C i /L i . Bad events can occur through both direct and indirect means. Direct risk, or internal risk, p i is the probability that player i will experience a bad event because of direct contamination. The standard IDS model assumes that investing will completely protect the player from direct contamination; hence, internal risk is only possible when a i = 0. Indirect risk q ji is the probability that player j is directly "contaminated," does not experience the bad event but transfers it to player i who ends up experiencing the bad event. There is an implicit global constraint on these parameters, by the axioms of probability: p i + n j=1 q ij ≤ 1 for all i. We now formally define a (directed) graphical games [Kearns, 2007 , Kearns et al., 2001 ] version of IDS games, as first introduced by Kearns and Ortiz [2003] . Denote by [n] ≡ {1, . . . , n} the set of n players. Note that the parameters q ij 's induce a directed graph
be the set of players that are parents of player i in G (i.e., the set of players that player i is exposed to via transfers), and by PF(i) ≡ Pa(i)∪{i} the parent family of player i, which includes i. Denote by k i ≡ | PF(i)| the size of the parent family of player i. Similarly, let Ch(i) ≡ {j | q ij > 0} be the set of players that are children of player i (i.e., the set of players to whom player i can present a risk via transfer) and CF(i) ≡ Ch(i) ∪ {i} the (children) family of player i, which includes i. The probability that player i is safe from player j, as a function of player j's decision, is
because if j invests, then it is impossible for j to transfer the bad event, while if j does not invest, then j either experiences the bad event or transfers it to another player, but never both.
Denote by a ≡ (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ {0, 1} n the joint action of all n players. Also denote by a −i the joint-action of all players except i and for any subset I ⊂ [n] of players, denote by a I the sub-component of the joint action corresponding to those players in I only. We define i's overall safety from all other players as s i (a Pa(i) ) ≡ j∈Pa(i) e ij (a j ) and equivalently his overall risk from some other players is r i (a Pa(i) ) ≡ 1 − s i (a Pa(i) ). Note that each players' external safety (and risk) is a direct function of its parents only, not all other players. From these definitions, we obtain player i's overall cost, the cost of joint action a ∈ {0, 1} n , corresponding to the (binary) investment decision of all players, is
IDD GAMES
In the standard IDS game model, investment in security does not reduce transfer risks. However, in some IDS settings (e.g., vaccination and cyber-security), it is reasonable to expect that security investments would include mechanisms to reduce transfer risks. This motivates our first modification to the traditional IDS games: allowing the investment in protection to not only makes us safe from direct attack but also partially reduce (or even eliminate) the transfer risk. We incorporate this factor by introducing a new real-valued parameter α i ∈ [0, 1] representing the probability that a transfer of a potentially bad event will go unblocked by i's security, assuming i has invested. Thus, we redefine player i's overall cost as
Next, we introduce an additional player, the attacker, who deliberately initiates bad events. (So that now bad events are no longer "chance occurrences" without any strategic deliberation.) The attacker has a target decision for each player -a choice of attack (b i = 1) or not attack (b i = 0) player i. Hence, the attacker's pure strategy is denoted by the vector b ∈ {0, 1} n . The game parameter p i implicitly "encodes" b i because b i = 0 implies p i = 0. Thus, we redefine p i ≡ p i (b i ) ≡ b i p i so that player i has intrinsic risk p i , and only has internal risk if targeted (i.e, b i = 1). The new parameter p i represents the (conditional ) probability that an attack is successful at player i given that player i was directly targeted and did not invest in protection. The game parameter q ij "encodes" b i = 1, because a prerequisite is that i is targeted before it can transfer the bad event to j. We redefine q ij ≡ q ij (b i ) ≡ b i q ij so that q ij is the intrinsic transfer probability from player i to player j, independent of b i . The new parameter q ij represents the (conditional ) probability that an attack is successful at player j given that it originated at player i, did not occur at i but was transferred undetected to j. Note that just as it was the case with traditional IDS games, there is an implicit constraint on the risk-related parameters: p i + j∈Ch(i) q ij ≤ 1, for all i. Because the p i 's and q ij 's depend on the attacker's action b, so does the safety and risk functions. In particular, we now have
We assume the attacker wants to cause as much damage as possible. One possible utility/payoff function U quantifying the objective of the attacker is
which adds the expected players costs (for targeted and transferred bad events) over all players, minus C 0 i , the attacker's own "cost" to target player i.
MIXED STRATEGIES IN IDD GAMES
For all player i, denote by x i the mixed strategy of player i: the probability that player i invests. Similarly, y denotes the joint probability mass function (PMF) corresponding to the attacker's mixed strategy so that for all b ∈ {0, 1} n , y(b) is the probability that the attacker executes joint-attack vector b.
Denote the marginal PMF over a subset I ⊂ [n] of the internal players by y I such that for all
is the (marginal) probability that the attacker chooses a joint-attack vector in which the subcomponent decisions corresponding to players in I are as in b I . Denote simply by y i ≡ y {i} (1) the marginal probability that the attacker chooses an attack vector in which player i is directly targeted. Slightly abusing notation, we redefine the function e ij (i.e., how safe i is from j), s i and r i (i.e., the overall transfer safety and risk, respectively) as
In general, the expected cost of protection to site i, with respect to a joint mixed-strategy (x, y), can be expressed as
The expected payoff of the attacker is
The best-response correspondence for the attacker is simply BR 0 (x) ≡ arg max y U (x, y).
If (x * , y * ) corresponds to a (deterministic) joint action then we call the MSNE a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE).
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Note that the attacker has in principle an exponential number of pure strategies! This affords the attacker unrealistic amount of power. Hence, we need restriction on the attacker's power. The simplest way is to allow at most a single simultaneous attack. We can weaken this assumption to allow the attacker at most K simultaneous attacks. Even then, the number of pure strategies will grow exponentially in the number of potential attacks, which still renders the attacker's pure-strategy space unrealistic, especially on a very large network with twenty-thousand nodes. Worstcase, we need to consider up to 2 n number of pure strategies for K attacks as K goes to n.
Assumption 1
The set of pure strategies of the attacker is B = {b ∈ {0,
The following assumptions are on the game parameters. The next assumption states that every site's investment cost is positive and (strictly) smaller than the conditional expected direct loss if the site were to be attacked directly (b i = 1); that is, if a site knows that an attack is directed against it, the site will prefer to invest in security, unless the external risk is too high. This assumption is reasonable because otherwise the player will never invest regardless of what other players do (i.e., not investing would be a dominant strategy).
Assumption 2 For all sites
The next assumption states that, for all sites i, the attacker's cost to attack i is positive and (strictly) smaller than the expected loss (i.e., gains from the perspective of the attacker) achieved if an attack initiated at site i is successful, either directly at i or at one of its children (after transfer); that is, if an attacker knows that an attack is rewarding (or able to obtain a positive utility), it will prefer to attack some nodes in the network. This assumption is reasonable; otherwise the attacker will never attack regardless of what other players do (i.e., not attacking would be a dominant strategy, leading to an easy problem to solve).
Assumption 3 For all sites
PSNE of IDD Games. It turns out that under these three assumptions, there is no PSNE in IDD games. This is typical of attacker-defender settings. The following proposition eliminates PSNE as a universal solution concept for natural IDD games in which at most one attack is possible. The main significance of this result is that it allows us to concentrate our efforts on the much harder problem of computing MSNE.
Proposition 1 No IDD game in which Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold has a PSNE.
MSNE OF IDD GAMES
We first consider the IDD games under the assumption that no protection from transfer risk, which is used in the original IDS games. Note that, throughout this subsection, we will be using the assumptions we made earlier (in additional to the following assumption).
Assumption 4 For all internal players i ∈ N , the probability that player i's investment in security does not protect the player from transfers, α i , is 1.
Definition 2
We say an IDD game is transfervulnerable if Assumption 4 holds. We say an IDD game is a single simultaneous attack game if Assumption 1 holds (i.e., at most one attack is possible).
Assumption 1, in the context of mixed strategies, implies the probability of no attack y 0 ≡ 1 − n i y i . Assumptions 1 and 4 greatly simplify the bestresponse condition of the internal players because now
i is a linear function of x i . Similarly, it will also be conve-
The best-response condition of the attacker also simplifies under the same assumptions because now
Assumption 3 is reasonable in our new context because, under Assumption 4, if there were a player i with η 0 i > 1, the attacker would never attack i, and as a result player i would never invest. In that case, we can safely remove j from the game, without any loss of generality.
We now characterize the space of MSNE in IDD games, which will immediately lead to a polynomial-time algorithm for computing all MSNE. Characterization. The characterization starts by partitioning the space of games into three, based on whether n i=1 ∆ i is (1) <, (2) =, or (3) > than 1. The rationale behind this is that now the players are indifferent between investing or not investing when y i = ∆ i , by the best-response correspondence the attacker's mixed strategy is restricted. The following result fully characterizes the set of MSNE in single simultaneous attack transfer-vulnerable IDD games.
Proposition 2 The joint mixed-strategy (x * , y * ) is an MSNE of a single simultaneous attack transfervulnerable IDD game in which 1. 
As proof sketch, we briefly state that the proposition follows from the restrictions imposed by the model parameters and their implication to indifference and monotonicity conditions. We also mention that the third case in the proposition implies that if the M 0 l 's form a complete order, then the last condition stated in that case allows us to search for a MSNE by exploring only n − 2 sets, vs. 2 n−2 if done naively.
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We now discuss properties of the characterization.
Security investment characteristics of MSNE.
At equilibrium x * , if x * i > 0, the probability of not investing is proportional to C 0 i and inversely proportional to p i L + j∈Ch(i) q ij L j . It is kind of reassuring the at equilibrium, which is the (almost-surely) unique stable outcome of the system, the probability of investing increases with the potential loss a player's non-investment decision could cause to the system. Hence, behavior in a stable system implicitly "forces" all players to indirectly account for or take care of their own children. This may sound a bit paradoxical at first given that we are working within "noncooperative" setting and each player's cost function is only dependent on the investment decision of the player's parents. Interestingly, the existence of the attacker in the system is inducing an (almost-surely) unique stable outcome in which an implicit form of "cooperation" occurs. A defenders's best response is independent of their parents, the source of transfer risk, if investment in security does nothing to protect that player from transfers (i.e., α i = 1). This makes sense because the player cannot control the transfer risk. Relation to network structure. How does the network structure and the equilibrium relate? As seen above, the values of the equilibrium strategy of each player depend on information from the attacker, the player and the player's children. From the discussion in the last paragraph, a player's probability of investing at the equilibrium increases with the expected loss sustained from a "bad event" occurring as a result of a transfer from a player to the player's children.
Let us explore this last point further by considering the case of uniform-transfer probabilities (also studied by Kunreuther and Heal [2003] and Kearns and Ortiz [2003] ). In that case, transfer probabilities are only a function of the source, not the destination: q ij ≡ δ i .
6 In fact, it turns out a complete order is not actually necessary because we can safely move all defenders with the same value of M 0 i in a group as a whole inside or outside the set I referred to in that case of the proposition.
The expression for the equilibrium probabilities of those players who have a positive probability of investing would simplify to
The last expression suggests that j∈Ch(i) L j differentiates the probability of investing between players. That would suggests the larger the number of children the larger the probability of investing. A scenario that seems to further lead us to that conclusion is when we make further assumptions (homogeneous system: first studied in the original IDS paper):
players. Then, we would get
. So the probability of not investing is inversely proportional to the number of children the player has. On the attacker's equilibrium strategy. The support of the attacker, I
* ≡ {i | y * i > 0}, at equilibrium has the following properties: (1) players for which the attacker's cost-to-expected-loss is higher are "selected" first in the algorithm; (2) if the size of that set is t, and there is a lower bound on ∆ i > ∆, and n i=1 ∆ i > 1, then t < 1/ ∆ is an upper-bound on the number of players that could potentially be attacked; (3) if we have a game with homogeneous parameters, then the probability of an attack will be uniform over that set I * ; and (4) all but one of the players in that set I * invest in security with some non-zero probability (almost surely).
COMPUTING MSNE EFFICIENTLY
We now describe an algorithm to compute all MSNE in single simultaneous attack transfer-vulnerable IDD games that falls off the Proposition 2. We begin by noting that the equilibrium in the case of IDD games with n i=1 ∆ i ≤ 1, corresponding to cases 1 and 2 of the proposition, has essentially an analytic closed-form. Hence, we concentrate on the remaining and most realistic case in large-population games of n i=1 ∆ i > 1. We start by sorting the indices of the internal players in descending order based on the M 0 i 's. Let Val(l) and Idx(l) be the lth value and index in the resulting sorted list, respectively. Find
e., continue down the sorted list of values until a change occurs). For i = 1, . . . , t − 1, let l = Idx(i) and set
and y * l = ∆ l . For i = k + 1, . . . , n, let l = Idx(i) and set x * l = 0 and y * l = 0. For i = t, . . . , k, let l = Idx(i) and set x * l = 0. Finally, represent the simplex defined by the following constraints:
. The running time of the algorithm is O(n log n) (because of sorting). As mentioned earlier, the theorem is significant because we do not know of any other non-trivial class of games that have algorithms to compute all Nash equilibria in polynomial time, except ours and the uniform IDS games [Kearns and Ortiz, 2003 ].
Theorem 1 There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute all MSNE of a single simultaneous attack transfer-vulnerable IDD game.
Note that the case in which n i=1 ∆ i = 1 has (Borel) measure zero and is quite brittle (i.e., adding or removing a player breaks the equality). For the case in which
8 then there is a unique MSNE!
EXPERIMENTS
In the previous section, we established the theoretical characteristics and computational tractability of single simultaneous attack IDD games with the highest transfer vulnerability parameter: α i = 1. In this section, partly motivated by security problems in cyberspace, we concentrate instead on empirically evaluating the other extreme of transfer vulnerability: games with low α i values (i.e., near 0), so that investing in security considerably reduces the transfer risk.
Our main objectives for the experiments presented here are (1) to demonstrate that a simple heuristic, best-response-gradient dynamics (BRGD), is practically effective in computing an (approximate) MSNE in a very large class of IDD games with realistic Internet-scale network graphs in a reasonable amount of time for cases in which the transfer vulnerabilities α i 's are low; and (2) to explore the general structural and computational characteristics of (approximate) MSNE in such IDD games, including their dependence on the underlying network structure of the game (and approximation quality).
BRGD is a well-known technique from the work on learning in games [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999 , Singh et al., 2000 , Kearns and Ortiz, 2003 , Heal and Kunreuther, 2005 , Kearns, 2005 . Here, we use BRGD as a tool to compute an -approximate MSNE, which is a joint mixed strategy with the property that the gain in utility (or reduction in cost) of any individual from unilaterally deviating from their prescribed mixed-strategy is no larger than ; a 0-approximate MSNE is an exact MSNE.
8 Distinct M 0 i 's for the set of defenders at which the sum goes over one is sufficient to guarantee unique MSNE. 
We obtained the latest version (March 2010 at the time) of the real structure and topology of the Autonomous Systems (AS) in the Internet from DIMES (netdimes.org) [Shavitt and Shir, 2005] . The AS-level network has 27, 106 nodes (683 isolated) and 100, 402 directed edges; the graph length (diameter) is 6, 253, the density (number of edges divided by number of possible edges) is 1.9920 × 10 −5 , and the average (in and out) degree is 3.70, with ≈ 76.93% and 2.59% of the nodes having zero indegree and outdegree, respectively. All the IDD games in the experiments presented in this section have this network structure.
For simplicity, we call Internet games the class of IDD games with the AS-level network graph and low α i values. We considered various settings for model parameters of Internet games: a single instance with specific fixed values; and several instances generated at random (see Table 1 for details). The attacker's costto-attack parameter for each node i is always held constant: C 0 i = 10 6 . For each run of each experiment, we ran BRGD with randomly-generated initial conditions (i.e., random initializations of the players' mixed strategies):
and y is a probability distribution generated uniformly at random, and independent of x, from the set of all probability mass functions over n + 1 events.
9 The initialization of the transfer-probability parameters of a node essentially gives higher transfer probability to children with high (total) degree (because they are potentially "more popular"). The initialization also enforces p i + j∈Ch(i) q ij = 0.9. Other initializations are possible but we did not explore then here.
COMPUTING -MSNE USING BRGD
Given the lack of theoretical guarantees on the convergence rate of BRGD, we began our empirical study by evaluating the convergence and computation/runningtime behavior of BRGD on Internet games. We ran The plots above present the number of iterations of BRGD as a function of under the two experimental conditions: Internet games with fixed (top) and randomly-generated parameters (bottom). Applying MSE regression to the top and bottom graphs, we obtain a functional expression for the number of iterations N F ( ) = 0.00003 −2.547 ( R 2 = 0.90415) and N R ( ) = 0.0291 −1.589 (R 2 = 0.9395), respectively (i.e., low-degree polynomials of 1/ ). ten simulations for each value and recorded the number of iterations until convergence (up to 2, 000 iterations). Figure 1 presents the number of iterations taken by BRGD to compute an -MSNE as a function of . All simulations in this experiment converged (except for = 0.001: 2 and all of the runs for single and randomly-generated instances, respectively, did not).
Each iteration took roughly 1-2 sec. (wall clock). Hence, we can use BRGD to consistently compute an -MSNE of a 27K-players Internet game in a few seconds!
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE -MSNE
We now concentrate on the empirical study of the structural characteristics of the -MSNE found by BRGD. We experimented on both the single and randomly-generated Internet game instances. We discuss the typical behavior of the attacker and the sites in an -MSNE, and the typical relationship between -MSNE and network structure.
A Single Internet Game
We first studied the characteristics of the -MSNE of a single Internet game instance. The only source of randomness in these experiments comes from BRGD's initial conditions (i.e., the initialization of the mixed strategies x and y). BRGD consistently found exact MSNE (i.e., = 0) in all runs. Players' equilibrium behavior. In fact, we consistently found that the attacker always displays only two types of "extreme" equilibrium behavior, corresponding to the two kinds of MSNE BRGD found for the single Internet game: place positive probability of a direct attack to either almost all nodes (Strategy A) or a small subset (Strategy B). Figure 2 shows a plot of the typical probability of direct attack for those two equilibrium strategies for the attacker when BRGD stops. In both strategies, a relatively small number of nodes (about 1K out of 27K) have a reasonably high (and near uniform) probability of direct attack. In Strategy A, however, every node has a positive probability of being the target of a direct attack, albeit relatively very low for most; this is contrast to Strategy B where most nodes are fully immune from a direct attack. Interestingly, none of the nodes invest in either MSNE: x * i = 0 for all nodes i. Thus, in this particular Internet game instance, all site nodes are willing to risk an attack! Relation to network structure. We found that the nodes with (relatively) high probability of direct attack are at the "fringe" of the graph (i.e., have low or no degree). In Strategy A, fringe nodes (with mostly 0 or 1 outdegree) have relatively higher probability of direct attack than nodes with higher outdegree. Similarly, in Strategy B, the small subset of nodes that are potential target of a direct attack have relatively low outdegree (mostly 0, and 0.0067 on average; this is in contrast to the average outdegree of 3.9639 for the nodes immune from direct attack). In short, we consistently found that the nodes with low outdegree gies for Randomly-Generated Internet Games: The graphs show the empirical distributions of the probability of attack (top) and histograms of the probability of investment (bottom), for different -value conditions encoded in the right-hand side of the plots (i.e., from 0.001 to 0.009). In both graphs, the distributions and histograms found for each value considered are drawn in the same corresponding graph superimposed. The top graph plots the distribution of yi where the nodes are ordered decreasingly based on the yi value. The bottom bar graph shows histograms of the probability of investing in defense/security measures based on the following sequence of 10 ranges partitioning the unit interval: ([0, 0.1], (0.1, 0.2], ..., (0.9, 1]).
are more likely to get attacked directly in the single Internet game instance.
Randomly-Generated Internet Games
We now present results from experiments on randomly-generated instances of the Internet game, a single instance for each ∈ {0.001, 0.002, . . . , 0.009}. For simplicity, we present the result of a single BRGD run on each instance.
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Behavior of the players. Figure 3 shows plots of the attacker's probability of direct attack and histograms of the nodes's probability of investment in a typical run of BRDG on each Internet game instance 10 While the results presented here are for a single instance of the Internet game for each , the results are typical of multiple instances. Our observations are robust to the experimental randomness in both the Internet game parameters and the initialization of BRGD. For the sake of simplicity of presentation, we discuss results based on a single instance of the Internet game, and in some cases based on a single BRGD run. Note that, for each value we considered, the Internet game parameters remain constant within different BRGD runs. BRGD always converged within 2, 000 iterations (except 6 runs for = 0.001). randomly-generated for each value. The plots suggest that approximate MSNE found by BRGD is quite sensitive to the value: as decreases, the attacker tends to "spread the risk" by selecting a larger set of nodes as potential targets for a direct attack, thus lowering the probability of a direct attack on any individual node; the nodes, on the other hand, tend to deviate from (almost) fully investing and (almost) not investing to a more uniform mixed strategy (i.e., investing or not investing with roughly equal probability). A possible reason for this is that as more nodes become potential targets of a direct attack, more nodes with initial mixed strategies close to the "extreme" (i.e., very high or very low probabilities of investing) will move closer to a more uniform (and thus less "predictable") investment distribution.
Relation to network structure. Figure  4 presents some experimental results on the relationship between network structure and the attacker's equilibrium behavior. The graphs show, for each value, the average indegree and outdegree, across the ten BRGD runs, of those nodes that are potential targets of a direct attack at an -MSNE. In general, both the average indegree and outdegree of the nodes that are potential targets of a direct attack tend to increase as decreases. One possible reason for this finding could be the fact that the values of α i generated for each player are relatively low (i.e., uniformly distributed over 0, 1 40 ); yet, interestingly, such behavior and pattern, is exact opposite of the theory for the case α i = 1.
